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Executive Summary
In January 2014, the National Academy of Social Insurance commissioned a study of the perfor-
mance of Integrated Delivery Networks (IDNs), incident to its Study Panel on Pricing Power in
Health Care Markets. The premise of this analysis was that any examination of the role that hospitals
play in health care cost growth is complicated by the fact that in most large markets, the significant
hospitals are part of larger, multi-divisional health enterprises. In these markets, hospitals may be part
of horizontally integrated hospital systems operating multiple hospitals; vertically integrated health
services networks that include physicians, post-acute services and/or health plans; or fully integrated
provider systems inside a health plan (e.g. with no other source of income than premiums) like
Kaiser Permanente. The latter two models are collectively labeled IDNs. 
IDNs have very different stated purposes than mere collections of hospitals:  to coordinate care
across the continuum of health services and to manage population health. IDN advocates claim that
these complex enterprises yield both societal benefits and performance advantages over less integrat-
ed competitors. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the evidence to support these claims.
Methodology
Despite more than 30 years of IDN development, remarkably little is known about their perfor-
mance. To fill this gap, the authors performed a comprehensive review of the academic literature on
IDN performance, as well as the broader question of the benefits of diversification (i.e., the efficiency
of offering diverse services under common sponsorship). 
The authors also conducted an analysis of publicly available financial and qualitative performance
data on nationally prominent IDNs and their subsidiary hospitals from their financial disclosures to
bond holders, Medicare cost reports, Medicare quality reporting systems, the Leapfrog Group’s
Safety analyses, and the Dartmouth Atlas’ reporting on care patterns at the end of life. Because quali-
ty and cost information is not aggregated at the IDN level, the authors compared the publicly avail-
able performance information on the IDNs’ flagship hospital in its principal metropolitan or regional
market with that flagship’s most significant in-market competitor.
Claimed IDN Benefits
In the literature review, claimed benefits generally fall into two categories: benefits to society and
benefits to the IDNs themselves. Under claimed societal benefits, the principal ones are providing
better coordinated care leading to improved quality and lower cost. These improvements are said to
derive from eliminating duplicative tests and reducing unnecessary care, as well as coordinating care
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across the continuum (physician’s office, hospital, and post-acute home care). Joining these activities
with the assumption of insurance risk, IDNs are believed to be able to pare down the volume incen-
tives inherent in fee-for-service medicine and allocate capital to areas of community need, including
health promotion and prevention. 
Under claimed provider rationales for IDN formation, the principal advantages are improved effi-
ciency (presumably translating into better operating performance) as well as enhanced market com-
petitiveness and bargaining power with employers and/or health plans. Vertical integration with
physicians and health plans is also believed to reduce uncertainty due to technological or delivery 
system change and lower administrative expense and transaction costs.
What Does the Evidence Show?  
There is scant evidence in the literature of either societal benefits or advantage accruing to providers
from IDN formation. From the societal perspective, there is little evidence that integrating hospital
and physician care has helped to promote quality or reduce costs. Indeed, there is growing evidence
that hospital-physician integration has raised physician costs, hospital prices and per capita medical
care spending. Similarly, hospital integration into health plan operations and capitated contracting
was not associated either with clinical efficiency (e.g. shorter lengths of stay) or financial efficiency
(e.g. lower charges per admission). 
From the provider perspective, the available evidence suggests that the more providers invest in IDN
development, the lower their operating margins and return on capital. Diversification into more busi-
nesses is associated with negative operating performance. This is consistent with the management 
literature, which shows that diversification increases a firm’s size and complexity, in turn increasing
its cost of coordination, information processing, and governance/monitoring. 
Moreover, there are few or no scope economies within health plans, hospitals, or physician groups —
let alone between these lines of business contained within IDNs. Provider-sponsored insurance plans
face similar problems regardless of whether they were formed by hospitals or physician groups:  poor
capitalization, lack of actuarial and underwriting expertise, limited marketing capability both to
employers and consumers, adverse selection risk, and an inability to reach minimum sufficient scale
of enrollment. 
Analyzing the Performance of 15 IDNs
As part of this report, the authors conducted a new analysis of 15 of the largest IDNs in the country.
Publicly disclosed hospital performance information is not aggregated at the IDN level, so it was
impossible to compare IDN performance with industry norms. However, we were able to evaluate
the relationship of IDN system profitability as well as net collected revenues with hospital market
concentration. We found no relationship between the degree of hospital market concentration and
IDN operating profits, or between the size of the IDN’s bed complement or its net collected rev-
enues and operating profits. 
Integrated Delivery Networks: In Search of Benefits and Market Effects2
National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI)   
Because there is extensive hospital-specific financial and quality reporting, the authors conducted a
secondary analysis of the performance of the IDN’s flagship hospital in its principal metropolitan or
regional market and its most significant local competitor. We found no detectable quality or safety
differences in a paired comparison between IDN flagship hospitals and their in-market competitors.
However, in 10 of 14 cases where comparison was possible, the IDN flagship had higher Medicare
cost per case, adjusted for case mix. Further, in 12 of the 15 cases where comparison was possible,
the IDN flagship hospital had higher total medical spending in the last two years of the patient’s life
vs. its in-market competitor, according to the Dartmouth Atlas.
Regarding IDN sponsorship of insurance, there was no discernible relationship between the amount
of “revenue at risk” (e.g. insurance premiums, capitated health plan revenue or two-sided risk by an
accountable care organization) and the IDN’s operating profit. However, IDN flagships in systems
that had no “revenues at risk” had 8% lower Medicare per case cost than their in-market competi-
tors, but flagship Medicare costs per case were 20% higher if the IDN had some “revenues at risk.” 
While there is IDN enterprise-level financial disclosure both to bond holders and to the federal gov-
ernment, gaps in these disclosures significantly hamper detailed analysis. In only five of the 15 IDNs
studied was it possible to determine the percentage of IDN revenues generated by their hospitals; in
none of the 15 was it possible to determine their hospitals’ contribution to IDN operating profit.
The same could be said of their physician groups: in only five of the 15 IDNs could it be determined
how much revenue was generated by physician services, let alone the contribution, if any, to the
IDN’s profits. 
Further, it was impossible to discern from their disclosures how ancillary income and overhead were
allocated between physician practices and the rest of the IDN’s businesses. The authors were also
unable to access claims information (due to limited resources) to determine how IDN provider busi-
nesses are paid by health plans (e.g. is the insurance risk retained by the IDN health plan or passed
on to providers through shared premium or capitated risk).
Conclusions
Despite more than 30 years of public policy advocacy on behalf of IDN formation, there is scant 
evidence in the literature either of measurable societal benefits from IDNs or of any comparative
advantage accruing to providers themselves from forming IDNs. We have similarly found no such
evidence in our analysis of 15 IDNs. Serious data limitations hamper anyone attempting to evaluate
IDN performance based on publicly disclosed information. IDN financial disclosures obscure the
operating performance of their hospitals and physician groups. 
There does not appear to be a relationship between hospital market concentration and IDN operat-
ing profit. However, if the performance of the IDN’s flagship hospital is any indicator of overall sys-
temic efficiency, the IDNs’ flagship hospital services appear to be more expensive, both on a
cost-per-case and on a total-cost-of-care basis, than the services of its most significant in-market com-
petitor. This runs counter to the theoretical claim of IDN operating efficiency. Further, the flagship
facilities of IDNs operating health plans or having significant capitated revenues are more expensive
per case (Medicare case-mix adjusted) than their in-market competitors. 
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The authors would have greater confidence in these findings if they covered not only multiple years
of information but also multiple institutions in the IDN portfolio (e.g. its suburban or rural hospi-
tals, etc.). Further, the central question of whether IDNs have abused their market power in metro-
politan markets can only be answered by examining actual service-specific payments to their hospitals
by local health plans and by determining the profits generated by their hospital portfolio. 
Policy Recommendations
The public interest would be served if IDNs provided more detailed routine operating disclosures
that would enable financial analysts, academic researchers, and the policy community to understand
the performance of IDNs’ subsidiary businesses and the overhead and revenue allocation strategies
they pursue. Present disclosures are less illuminating than those of publicly traded hospital operators
and are inadequate to answer definitively the question of whether there are measurable societal or
institutional benefits from IDN formation.
The two crucial disclosures needed are the amount of hospital operating profit as a percentage of the
IDN’s total earnings and the IDN’s physician and hospital compensation policies. How IDNs allo-
cate overhead and ancillary services income between the three main lines of business should also be
disclosed. It should also be possible to determine from an IDN disclosure if capitated risk is trans-
mitted from the IDN’s health plan or risk-accepting organization to its hospitals and physicians.
Analysis of societal benefits would also be materially aided by a comprehensive, national all-payer
claims database that would enable comparative analysis of what IDNs are paid for hospital and 
physician services compared to their competitors. 
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Introduction
In the summer of 2013, the National Academy of Social Insurance created a panel to study the effect
of pricing power on health care markets. One concern of this panel is that the consolidation of 
hospitals might have led to hospital market concentration that enables dominant actors to demand
and receive quasi-monopoly prices for their services from local and national insurers.
However, in most large metropolitan health care markets, the major hospitals are subsidiaries of larg-
er enterprises. Hospitals may be part of horizontally integrated hospital systems operating multiple 
hospitals in the community, region, or nationally; vertically-integrated health services networks that
include physicians and/or health plans operating in one or more communities; or fully integrated
provider systems inside a health plan (e.g. with no other source of income than premiums) like
Kaiser Permanente. The latter two models are collectively termed Integrated Delivery Networks
(IDNs). The fact that these latter enterprises are arrayed across the continuum of care and assume
premium risk significantly complicates the analytic task of understanding the influence of their hospi-
tal assets on health care prices or utilization. 
The stated purposes of IDNs are very different from those of multi-hospital systems: to integrate
care across a continuum of providers and to assume responsibility for the health of populations.
Simply to assume that IDNs are mere collections of hospitals is to commit a category error. Many
IDN CEOs argue that they created their systems to defend themselves against the pressures of highly
concentrated health insurance markets or to anticipate public policy demands for accountable care
and population health. IDN managements will further argue that the pricing power they exert in
hospital markets is to serve larger social purposes: creating care management infrastructure, subsidiz-
ing services in the care continuum that are not adequately paid for directly (including, many would
argue, physician services), caring for those without health insurance, supporting medical education
and research, and providing community service. 
For more than 30 years, health policy advocates have urged that hospital systems transform them-
selves into IDNs as the logical infrastructure for population health. Advocates believe that IDNs
should be structured like large prepaid group practices such as Kaiser, whose sole source of revenues
is health premiums. Those advocates believe that as IDNs assume more economic risk, either dele-
gated risk through capitated payments from health plans or actual insurance risk through “captive”
health plans, IDNs will evolve into Kaiser-like entities, with compelling incentives to control costs. 
Many IDNs already sponsor their own health plans, contract on a capitated basis with health plans,
or are active participants in accountable care organization (ACO) demonstrations where they assume
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at least one-sided risk. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) prompted hospitals
to engage in multiple strategies simultaneously: merging into larger hospital systems, acquiring physi-
cian practices and assembling them into groups, developing health plans, and entering risk contracts. 
What is known about the economics of IDNs? Do IDNs return benefits to society commensurate
with their stated purposes to “integrate care across the continuum and manage the health of popula-
tions?” Where do they generate their net income? How much of their revenue is “at risk” and how
does it affect system performance? What is the relationship between their stream of earnings and the
community benefits they provide?  
To date, despite more than 30 years of policy advocacy on their behalf, very little is actually known
about IDN performance. In a recent report, the Brookings Institution (2013) noted that the poten-
tial for cost and quality benefits flowing from current restructuring efforts by providers is unknown.
This paper seeks to address the gap in our understanding of IDNs using a mixture of familiar and new
methods. 
We first review the academic research on the reality of IDNs’ claimed societal benefits. We then
examine the performance of IDNs using data gathered in a new manner. We analyze a sample of 
15 nationally prominent IDNs drawing data from their public financial disclosures. We seek to deter-
mine the degree to which these IDNs integrate their three principal missions (hospital and facilities,
physician services, and health plans) and how to characterize their performance. 
Using this sample, we also make head-to-head comparisons of the IDN’s flagship hospital and its
principal competitor in their local market to determine if any systemic advantages accrue from mem-
bership in the dominant local health system. This exercise demonstrates the difficulties researchers
face in evaluating IDN performance and suggests the types of data that may be needed to address
the issue. At the end of the paper, we discuss the policy implications of our findings in an era of
increasing “transparency.” 
Literature Review 
IDNs link together acute-care hospitals with ambulatory care ser-
vices (e.g., physician offices, surgical and imaging facilities, etc.),
post-acute services (e.g., home health, rehabilitation, skilled nurs-
ing), and, in many cases, insurance vehicles that cover geographic
markets served by the provider businesses. The theoretical benefits
of IDNs fall into two broad categories. First, there are potential
societal benefits from integrated care: improvements in access to
and quality of health care as well as reduced cost due to improved
care coordination. Second, IDNs may yield potential provider ben-
efits from integrated care: increased efficiency and ability to
achieve economies of scale and scope as well as improved bargain-
ing power with health insurers, enabling greater profitability and financial performance. These latter
Integrated Delivery Networks: In Search of Benefits and Market Effects6
There are potential 
societal benefits from
integrated care: 
improvements in access
to and quality of health
care as well as reduced
cost due to improved care
coordination.
benefits may or may not be passed on to society in general, or to business-
es, consumers and public payers, in the form of lower prices or improved
service. 
Following this summary, we briefly discuss the theorized dimensions of
integration contained in IDNs; such forms of integration might influence
the impact of integration efforts. We also discuss the results of integration
observed to date, proposed barriers to integration, and lessons from 
previous experiences with integration. We conclude with a discussion of
corporate diversification, the evidence from the provider and health plan
industries on the benefits (if any) of diversification — including evidence on
the Kaiser system, the widely cited IDN exemplar — and the empirical
challenges of documenting such benefits.
“The Right Care at the Right Place at the Right Time”: 
Potential Societal Benefits of Integrated Delivery Networks
Advocates suggest that the central benefit of IDNs is to provide patients “seamless,” coordinated
health services along the full “continuum of care” (Burns and Pauly, 2002; Coddington and Moore,
1994; Conrad and Shortell et al., 1993a; Shortell et al., 2000). Vertically integrated health systems
are said to allow comprehensive “one-stop shopping” for care through improved coordination
among providers (physicians, hospitals, post-acute providers), including sharing of information
through medical records available at all points of care (Budetti et al., 2002; Conrad and Dowling,
1990; Peters, 1991). 
Further, IDNs could address challenges that a more fragmented delivery
system is ill equipped to handle, including chronic disease management,
incorporating advances in technology, and new care settings (e.g. ambula-
tory surgery centers, urgent care centers), as well as dealing with potential
provider shortages (Devers et al., 1994). The most commonly cited societal
benefit of integrated delivery networks, however, is better coordinated care
leading to improved quality and lower costs. 
Two main types of quality improvements come up in the literature: 
(1) Reduction of duplicative tests and procedures and elimination of 
unnecessary care, and (2) Assumption of the health of a local population by an integrated system,
enabling coordinated health services across sites of care (e.g., between a 
hospitalization and post-acute care), as well as providing the social and financial support needed 
during an illness (Burns and Pauly, 2002; Robinson and Casalino, 1996; Shortell et al., 1993;
Walston, Kimberly and Burns, 1996). 
Enthoven (2009) cited competition between integrated delivery systems as a potential “cure for
[the] fragmentation” that characterizes health services provision in the United States. He noted the
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importance of eliminating waste from unnecessary and potentially unsafe care for improving quality
and reducing costs. Similarly, Shortell, Gillies et al. (1993b) when reporting on their study of inte-
grated health care systems noted, 
Integration, of course, is not an end in itself but a means for promoting healthier
patients and ultimately healthier communities. When integration is missing, patients
are at greater risk for harmful practices and suboptimal service. Indeed, the ultimate
payoff from organized delivery systems will not be in administrative or managerial
economies of scale but in clinical integration – the ability to provide a coordinated
continuum of services that meet patient needs and expectations in a cost-effective
fashion. 
IDNs with an in-house insurance vehicle that collects a premium
for each patient may have a special advantage here. These IDNs
can theoretically manage the patient’s care across the provider 
continuum, reducing or eliminating the volume incentives 
inherent in fee-for-service medicine and emphasizing instead the
allocation of capital and personnel to areas of community need,
health promotion, and prevention (Burns and Thorpe, 1993). 
Such models might also offer the necessary salaries and benefits to
recruit and retain the appropriate types of physicians and other
caregivers, as well as assume managed care functions at the system
level (thereby lowering the administrative hassles of negotiation,
billing, credentialing, etc., for individual physicians) (Peters, 1991). Finally, IDNs may foster greater
alignment among hospitals, physicians, and health plans that, theoretically, result in comprehensive,
community-based systems of care similar to Kaiser.
In terms of cost reduction, advocates suggest that vertically 
integrated care delivery would result in improved efficiency (e.g.,
through reductions in unnecessary and duplicative care) and 
lowered transaction and administrative costs that could, in turn,
translate into patient savings (e.g. through use of internal 
hierarchies and controls rather than market transactions to 
coordinate activities)  (Burns and Pauly, 2002; Burns, Goldsmith
and Sen, 2013; Walston, Kimberly and Burns, 1996, Robinson
and Casalino, 1996). 
Further, strengthened administrative controls may allow systems to “achieve better cost and quality
control through strong group norms, peer pressure, and integrated finances” (Cuellar and Gertler,
2006). In addition, integrated systems may be able to better adapt to and succeed in new financing
mechanisms such as pay-for-performance and bundled payments than individual providers (Crosson
and Tollen, 2010). 
IDNs with an in-house
insurance vehicle … can
theoretically manage the
patient’s care across the
provider continuum,
reducing or eliminating
the volume incentives
inherent in fee-for-
service medicine.
…vertically integrated
care delivery would result
in improved efficiency
and lowered transaction
and administrative costs
that could, in turn, 
translate into patient 
savings.
These types of efficiency gains are typically considered a key rationale for vertical integration in any
setting, resulting from increased centralized control and coordination across stages of production
and economies of information and technology, as well as potentially reduced costs of monitoring and
negotiation due to gains in mutual dependence and trust from integration (Gaynor and Haas-
Wilson, 1999; Walston, Kimberly and Burns, 1996). 
If IDNs centralize information systems and mechanisms for utilization review and quality assurance,
these systems may also be able to “exploit opportunities to coordinate market exchanges internally,
improve the exchange of information between adjacent stages in the vertical chain, and jointly opti-
mize profits across these stages of production” (Burns and Thorpe, 2001). 
Provider-Centric Rationales for IDN Formation
The benefits of vertical integration that accrue to hospitals and physicians,
rather than to society as a whole or to patients in particular, have been the
main focus in the literature on IDNs. In addition to improvements in effi-
ciency, IDN advocates have pointed to enhanced market competitiveness
and strengthened provider bargaining power as benefits of integration,
especially given an expected movement toward capitated payment
(Walston, Kimberly and Burns, 1996). 
A lot of this literature appeared during or after the Clinton-era drive
toward health reform, which would have channeled provider payments
through capitated payment to risk-managing IDNs. Also, as mentioned previously, some IDNs
developed for market-specific defensive reasons. The rise of managed care, and the perceived threat
posed by the rise of capitated contracting, created anxiety among providers that fueled their efforts
to form IDNs (Dranove, Simon, and White, 2002; Town et al., 2007). Vertically integrated systems
were seen as affording health care providers competitive leverage given possible movement toward
closed-panel networks, global capitation, and consequent downsizing of provider capacity (Burns,
Goldsmith and Muller, 2010; Shortell, Gillies and Anderson, 1994). 
Putting aside the question of hospital mergers, it is debatable whether vertical integration between
hospitals and physician has actually helped improve their market power and competitiveness (Gaynor,
2006). Some have argued that consolidating with upstream suppliers gains hospital-physician firms
monopoly or quasi-monopoly power, in turn improving bargaining power for negotiations with
managed care plans and other insurers and increasing price leverage (Walston, Kimberly and Burns,
1996). 
There is an extensive literature on so-called vertical “foreclosure,” although it is somewhat contradic-
tory. One argument here is that the formation of exclusive hospital-physician relationships is a means
of product differentiation within the market as well as a hospital strategy to protect its key source of
patients — physician referrals — while preventing competitors’ access to these inputs (Burns and
Pauly, 2002). From the hospital perspective, these relationships both ensure that physicians them-
selves will not compete with hospitals (e.g., by encroaching on the hospital outpatient care market)
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and augment the IDN’s ability to compete with other entrants into outpatient and inpatient markets
(e.g., ambulatory surgical center, imaging centers, etc). 
However, there is scant empirical evidence on the anti-competitive effects of vertical integration by
hospitals. Tellingly, the antitrust community has not embraced vertical foreclosure as a competitive
problem. There is a strong sense among some researchers that the merger of two powerful actors in
adjacent stages of the vertical chain (e.g., a powerful hospital and a powerful medical group) will
increase provider market power, but, until recently, the regulatory agencies did not appear confident
of this. This changed in 2014. In a case brought by the Federal Trade Commission and the Idaho
Attorney General, a U.S. District Court ruled that the St. Lukes Health System in Boise violated
antitrust laws by its acquisition of the large primary care-based Saltzer Medical Group. This is a rich
area for investigation going forward given the pace of vertical consolidation in the industry. 
Current advocates of vertical integration cite several drivers
beyond increased market power. Cleveland Clinic CEO Toby
Cosgrove recently suggested that vertical integration is being dri-
ven not only by the fact that acute-care hospitals are becoming less
dominant in a health system where an increasing amount of care is
occurring in hospital outpatient departments and physician offices
but also in newer settings, such as retail clinics and drugstores. In
addition, cost pressures are compelling providers to use new tech-
nologies, such as tele-health and remote patient monitoring, to
improve efficiency and reduce duplication of care (Betbeze, 2013).
This argument suggests that vertical integration may be motivated
by provider uncertainty regarding their future role in health care delivery due to technological and
delivery system innovation. However, reducing provider uncertainty is neither a compelling societal
rationale nor a guarantor of increased efficiency savings.
For physicians, integration with (e.g. employment by) hospitals can offer access to capital and tech-
nology, protection against a changing policy and payment landscape, more stable incomes, and better
work-life balance, which is increasingly attractive to physicians (Burns and Pauly, 2002; Burns,
Goldsmith and Muller, 2010; Burns and Muller, 2008). 
Insurance offerings play a strategic role in many IDNs. Indeed, some argue that it is the insurance
function that integrates the diverse service businesses owned by the IDN. Promoters of the IDN
concept such as Alain Enthoven and Paul Ellwood advocated that communities should be served by
multiple Kaiser-like entities that are more or less clinically self-sufficient and are paid through insur-
ance premiums (per capita per year), rather than through fee for service. This transformation pre-
sumably turns hospitals and other facilities that are presently profit centers into cost centers
consuming resources within a fixed budget (that is, yearly premium times membership), as well as
fostering value-based competition at the level of IDNs, not individual hospitals or physician practices. 
At some point in the risk assumption process, containing provider expense and rationalizing service
use presumably becomes the key to profitability. There are two problems with this argument. First,
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achieving this fundamental reversal in incentives requires major cultural
change on the part of providers — change that has proven highly challeng-
ing given the cultural legacy of a fee-for-service system. Second, this type of
integration increases provider economic risk and thus uncertainty. The
most significant risks for provider-sponsored insurance efforts are adverse
selection within the community’s risk pool and the difficulties in exerting
economic discipline across a diffused and fragmented medical community.
Risk assumption also increases uncertainty at the enterprise level because
the enterprise is interacting with multiple markets with conflicting incen-
tives at the same time. 
There are numerous rationales for IDN sponsorship of insurance vehicles. Providers may develop
insurance plans to jump-start population health management in the face of commercial insurers’
reluctance to delegate risk to them. Captive insurance contracts might also result in replacement of
revenues lost to provider payment cuts. Finally, captive insurance plans may expose plan subscribers
to the provider system through the health benefit offering, helping increase hospital and physician
market shares. 
Of course, some of these aims could conceivably be accomplished with less enterprise risk by con-
tracting with existing plans on a delegated-risk-basis. That depends crucially on the willingness of
established health plans to delegate risk to providers. Insurers are aware that many providers
embarked on this strategy (often unsuccessfully) in the 1990s as they developed physician-hospital
organizations and salaried physician models to contract with health maintenance organizations
(HMOs).
Health plan sponsorship by provider systems could help providers to compete with existing 
vertically integrated systems like Kaiser, limiting outflow of their patients to these closed models.
Integration into insurance allows providers the flexibility to offer their own fully integrated insurance
product (like Kaiser) and to contract with other health insurers on a delegated-risk basis (unlike
Kaiser). 
Vertical integration may also potentially increase bargaining power with other insurers in the local
market. Offering employers a health plan endows the provider system with a Kaiser-like image
(Burns and Thorpe, 1993). In addition, in-house insurance plans often promise but rarely deliver
advantages to participating physicians of lessened intrusion of medical management activities and
higher provider payment rates (Burns and Thorpe, 2001). 
There has been a recent flurry of provider interest in either establishing health plans or assuming
population health risk since the passage of the PPACA. One driver has been PPACA itself, which
encouraged providers to establish ACOs to participate in the Medicare Shared Savings Program
(MSSP) as well as to contract with insurers in the private sector. To date, there are well over 600
such ACOs in operation (Muhlestein, 2014).
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The Evidence on Physician-Hospital Integration 
The literature on physician-hospital integration is replete with prescriptive models on how to 
organize the relationships between hospitals and physicians to bridge these historically independent
sectors. The early integration literature emphasized the need for a set of common structures to align
the two parties. These structures included physician-hospital organizations (PHOs), management
services organizations (MSOs), independent practice associations (IPAs), foundation-style medical
group models, and integrated salary models (ISMs). 
There is little evidence that these structures, by themselves, have helped promote quality or reduce
costs (Cuellar and Gertler, 2006; Madison, 2004; Ciliberto and Dranove, 2006); in fact, some rela-
tionships might run in just the opposite direction. Indeed, there is recent evidence that the growing
absorption of physician practices into hospitals has resulted in higher hospital prices and spending
(Baker, Bundorf and Kessler, 2014). One recent study of physician organizations in California
reported that groups owned by local hospitals spend 10 percent more per patient than physician-
owned groups; groups owned by multihospital systems spend nearly 20 percent more per patient
(Robinson and Miller, 2014). The higher spending by hospital-owned groups covered inpatient,
outpatient, pharmaceutical, and diagnostic services — suggesting there may be little cost-reducing
coordination of care across the continuum of services in integrated models and/or greater utilization
across the continuum. Hospital employment of physicians also is associated with lower physician pro-
ductivity and higher operating costs among the physician practices. (Gans, 2012, Gans and Wolper,
2013.) There is also little evidence that other vehicles to integrate physicians with hospitals —
whether through economic ties or non-economic ties — produced the expected benefits (Burns and
Muller, 2008). 
There is little evidence that different hospital-physician structures have much
advantage in fostering alignment between the two parties that 
might translate into improved quality and reduced costs (Burns,
Goldsmith, and Sen, 2013). While it seems clear that integration
structures and vehicles are not sufficient, following Donabedian
(1988), we might inquire whether the presence of intervening
processes makes a difference for achieving outcomes. Research 
suggests that simply creating integrated structures without the
enabling care management and governance processes may not
translate into performance improvement (Burns et al., 2001).
The Health Systems Integration Study (HSIS) posited three forms
of integration that relied upon process indicators and that formed
a causal model of performance in hospital systems (Devers et al.,
1994). The three forms were (1) functional integration — standardization of administrative activities
across hospitals within a system; (2) physician-system integration — efforts to organize physicians
into groups, efforts to tie them to the system in economic and administrative relationships, and stan-
dardization of medical staff activities across hospitals within the system; and (3) clinical integration
— standardization of clinical activities (e.g., protocols, medical records, clinical support services, etc.)
across hospitals within the system. This typology has been widely adopted in academic research. 
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However, the HSIS found little evidence during the 1990s that hospital systems had moved beyond
the first form of integration, that one form of integration (e.g., physician-system) correlated with
subsequent forms of integration (e.g., clinical processes), or that these forms of integration were 
consistently linked with improved financial performance of systems (Devers, et al., 1994; Gillies et
al., 1994). 
Subsequent work conducted by the HSIS researchers has focused on key elements of infrastructure
in these integrated systems, such as clinical information technology (e.g., electronic medical records)
and care management practices (CMPs). There is little evidence to date across all of their studies that
these elements impact quality and cost in any meaningful or consistent manner (Burns, Goldsmith,
and Sen, 2013).
The evidence suggests that Donabedian’s (1988) stages of structure, process, and outcome are only
loosely coupled together and not highly correlated in health care settings. One explanation for these
results is that such models are too simplistic for explaining performance differences among firms.
The health care integration literature is replete with lists of barriers to integration that strategies and
structures do not anticipate and cannot easily overcome (Shortell et al., 1993; Burns and Muller,
2008). Moreover, the literature on organizational change suggests that effective implementation
(i.e., execution) is much more important than strategy for subsequent success. This important but
usually neglected observation was noted long ago by the HSIS researchers themselves (Gillies,
Shortell, Devers et al., 1994). 
Provider-Insurance Integration
There is very little empirical research on the performance of provider integration with insurance 
vehicles. This may reflect the historically low and falling rate of provider
sponsorship of health plans: since 2000, only 10-15 percent of hospitals
participated in sponsoring an HMO and only 15-20 percent sponsored a
preferred provider organization — both below the levels observed during
the 1990s (data courtesy of Peter Kralovec, Health Forum, 2014). The lack
of research may also reflect the paucity of data on both provider and health
plan performance. 
One study of 36 large IDNs that contained hospitals, physicians, and health
plans found that the more providers invested in their IDNs, the lower their
operating margins. Moreover, as hospitals diversified into these different
businesses, the larger was the negative impact on their financial position
(e.g. higher debt to capitalization ratio). (Burns, Gimm, and Nicholson,
2005). A more recent study has found that integration of health plans with
providers (hospitals or physician groups) to serve the Medicare Advantage
population is associated with higher plan premiums (Frakt, Pizer, and
Feldman, 2013). 
Provider-sponsored insurance plans have faced similar fates regardless of whether they were formed
by hospitals or physician groups (Burns and Thorpe, 2001). Common problems included poor capi-
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talization, lack of actuarial and underwriting expertise, lack of consumer and employer marketing
capabilities, the inability to reach a minimum efficient scale (i.e., enough enrollees), the inability to
compete with much larger commercial insurers in the local market, and the tendency to enroll 
current patients who were poor risks (the adverse selection risk discussed previously). 
The issue of scale is especially important. Prior research from the 1990s showed that the minimum
efficient scale for health maintenance organizations was 100,000 enrollees (Given, 1996; Wholey,
Feldman, Christianson et al., 1996). More recent evidence from McKinsey, likewise, suggests that
sales, general and administrative costs for payers flatten out after reaching 100,000 lives (Singhal,
2013). 
By contrast, health plans operated by providers are typically smaller in size. Recent statistics indicate
there were 606 ACOs with roughly 18 million lives at the end of the fourth quarter in 2013
(Muhlestein, 2014). This yields an average enrollment of only 30,000 lives — well below the scale
required to perform health-plan-like functions efficiently. 
A further issue hampering provider-sponsored health plans is their tendency to build enrollment on
their current patient base, which leads to unfavorable risk selection and higher medical loss ratios.
McKinsey concluded there is no guarantee for value creation by payer-provider integration, particu-
larly in the commercial market, since the costs incurred may outweigh the cost savings (Singhal,
2014). 
A field study of six IDNs in Illinois found a different set of challenges facing providers who set up
insurance vehicles. Primary among these was the difficulty in balancing the interests of the three par-
ties in the IDN: hospitals, physicians, and health plan managers. This difficulty manifested itself in
several ways, including conflicts over capital allocation across the three business lines, coordinating
decision-making among the three businesses, and subsidizing one business (e.g., employed physi-
cians) with revenues from the other two businesses (Burns, 1999). 
The Logic and Performance of Diversification
Diversification is defined as the expansion of the firm across product, geographic, and customer mar-
kets. Firms have traditionally relied on this strategy for one of three major goals: growth, risk reduc-
tion, and profitability. Commonly sought benefits include scope economies (via shared resources and
capabilities across businesses), economies from internalized transactions, and improved access to mar-
ket information (Grant, 2010). The benefits of scope economies are often referred to as synergies.
Other rationales include the firm’s effort to escape an increasingly unattractive market and to make
effective use of surplus cash flows by investing them in more attractive products or services. 
Despite decades of research, there is no solid evidence that either more diversified firms outperform
less diversified firms or diversified firms outperform those that focus. One approach to resolve the
conflicting findings suggested that diversification exhibited an inverse U-shaped relationship with
performance, whereby firms with moderate levels of diversification outperformed those with much
more or no diversification (Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000). More recent evidence does not con-
firm this pattern, however (Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley, 2010).
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A major contributor to the performance problem is that diversification increases the firm’s size and
complexity, which in turn increases the firm’s cost of coordination, information processing, and 
governance and monitoring. Such costs likely increase with the unrelatedness of the new businesses
operated by the firm. Corporate firms in the U.S. recognized this problem
in the mid- to late-1980s when they unbundled themselves from prior con-
glomerate acquisitions and focused more on their core competence. 
On the health plan side, Given (1996) and Wholey, et al. (1996) reported
that HMOs suffered from scope diseconomies as they diversified from
commercial to Medicare and Medicaid lines of business. On the hospital
side, early evidence failed to show that diversification into alternate services
improved operating performance (Clement, 1987) or that related diversifi-
cation outperformed unrelated diversification (Clement, D’Aunno, and
Poyzer, 1993). Evidence also showed few scope economies from hospitals
operating both inpatient and outpatient lines of business (Cowing and
Holtman, 1983; Granneman, Brown, and Pauly, 1986). 
More recent studies reported that hospital integration into health plans, capitated contracting, and
non-hospital services were not associated with either clinical efficiency (shorter lengths of stay) or
financial efficiency (lower charges per admission) (Lin and Wan, 1999). Conversely, evidence gath-
ered during the debate over single-specialty hospitals failed to find greater
efficiencies in focused factories compared to general medical-surgical 
hospitals (although the former did exhibit the same or higher level of
patient satisfaction and quality of care) (Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, 2005; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2005).
These results received additional confirmation in studies of hospitals with
higher levels of specialization in cardiovascular care (Clark and Huckman,
2012). Finally, on the physician side, a recent review found few scope
economies among group practices that take on a multispecialty mix of
providers (Burns, Goldsmith, and Sen, 2013).
Taken together, these results suggest few or no scope economies within
health plans, hospitals, and physician groups that diversify. It is therefore
difficult to see why there might be scope economies in health care organizations that link all of these
components together. That is, can there really be synergies in linking together payers, hospitals, and
physician groups when each has achieved no synergies in their own diversification efforts? Can the
IDN whole really be greater than the sum of its constituent parts?
We conclude from this literature that hospital services, physician care, and health plan operations are
very different business lines, with few assets and capabilities that can be shared across them to lever-
age savings and efficiencies. As a result, there may be little opportunity to reduce the average costs of
each business as they become integrated with one another. Of course, it might be possible to achieve
synergies by increasing the joint revenues of these different businesses (e.g., via coordinated branding
and marketing strategies). However, with the exception of the Blue Cross plans, Kaiser, and a hand-
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ful of prominent medical groups (Mayo, Cleveland Clinic), few payers or providers have achieved
that type of brand image. 
It is also possible to achieve synergies by sharing information and knowledge across the different
business lines to achieve “spillovers’ (e.g., improved ability to perform population health manage-
ment). However, integration might just as easily lead to negative spillovers if the integration renders
the different business lines more interdependent and thus more susceptible to negative shocks in any
one line. Integration is also likely to consume excess capacity and other slack resources (e.g., as one
line of business subsidizes another) that then make it difficult to take advantage of positive shocks
and opportunities in the marketplace.
The Kaiser model includes all three lines of business (Kaiser Health Plan, Kaiser Hospitals,
Permanente Medical Group). It is unique in that insurance premiums from its own “captive” 
product have been, until very recently, the sole source of income to the enterprise. Kaiser now
charges copayments to individual patients through so-called consumer-directed products. 
Because there are so few organizations like Kaiser, there is naturally little comparative data on its 
performance. There are occasional books and articles extolling the virtues of the Kaiser model, often
written by Kaiser-affiliated researchers (Enthoven and Tollen, 2004; Crosson, 2005). There are also
some consulting firm reports that suggest the superiority of the Kaiser model (Aon-Hewitt, 2011).
Otherwise, there is no evidence that we know of that documents the competitive efficiency of the
Kaiser model. 
Indeed, during the 1980s and 1990s, Kaiser had difficulty exporting its own model to other parts of
the U.S. beyond its native Pacific Coast market (Gitterman, Weiner, Domino et al., 2003). Ho
(2008) analyzed some of the reasons for the limited market success (measured by growth and expan-
sion) of vertically integrated health insurers such as Kaiser. She concluded that integrated plans like
Kaiser need to reduce their per-member-per-month premiums to compensate enrollees for its limited
network of hospitals and physicians. Such insurers are unlikely to have costs that are low enough to
make such a strategy workable; instead, they must offer superior quality instead. The ability to attract
enrollees based on superior quality is weakened, however, by the high quality offered by competitor
plans as well as by information failures. 
Robinson (2004) argued that such plans required four elements to succeed: multispecialty groups,
capitated payment, exclusive payer-provider network linkages, and, crucially, a market framework that
offered multiple choice of plans, defined contribution, and open enrollment. Many of these pieces
are not prevalent across the U.S.; many are not found together in local markets; and some (multispe-
cialty groups) are not increasing in prevalence.
Even if there were synergies between these three lines of business, researchers would be hard pressed
to identify them. One major reason is what evaluation researchers call “multiple treatment interfer-
ence.” This occurs when the same organization embarks on multiple strategies either at the same
time (making it hard to disentangle their separate effects) or at different times (making it hard to
control for the effects of the prior strategy (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). To disentangle these
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effects and document them empirically, researchers will need data on the performance of all three
business lines over time in a large sample of IDNs. Complicating the issue will be the tendency for
IDNs to subsidize one business line with profits earned in others. 
IDN Financial/Performance Analysis
To study IDN performance, we selected 15 nationally prominent IDNs that are dominant actors in
their respective metropolitan and regional hospital markets. We attempted to cover all regions of the
U.S. (though three of the sample are in Pennsylvania). 
The sample:
  Advocate Health Care (suburban Chicago)
  Banner Health (principally Arizona)
  Henry Ford Health System (Detroit)
  North Shore–LIJ Health System (suburban New York)
  Aurora Health Care (Milwaukee/Wisconsin)
  Intermountain Health Care (Utah/Idaho)
  Penn Medicine (Philadelphia)
  Sanford Health (Dakotas)
  Sentara Healthcare (Virginia)
  BayCare Health System (Tampa/St. Petersburg)
  Sutter Health (Northern California)
  UPMC (Western Pennsylvania)
  Geisinger Health System (Central Pennsylvania)
  Johns Hopkins Medicine (Maryland) 
  Presbyterian Healthcare Services (New Mexico)
Data Sources
When these IDNs, all of which are nonprofit, need to raise capital in public bond markets, they are
required to make financial disclosures incident to the bond issuance, as well as continuing disclosures
of their operating performance. These disclosures are archived online in EMMA (Electronic
Municipal Market Archive) and maintained for the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. Those
IDNs that operate health plans must disclose their operating performance to their state insurance
commissions. 
As nonprofit entities, IDNs are also required to disclose their income and expenditures to the U.S.
Internal Revenue Service on Form 990. These forms detail charitable contributions, various forms of
uncompensated care and community benefit, donations, certain operating expenditures by category,
as well as executive and contractor compensation. These are lengthy filings, some over 200 pages,
and depending on the IDN’s corporate structure, multiple 990s are typically found. Like most tax
returns, they provide an astonishing amount of information in great detail but of questionable use-
fulness for actually understanding the business. 
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These filings did not provide a complete picture of IDN finances. Only five of the sample’s disclo-
sures were enterprise wide (e.g. IDN-wide) disclosures. Moreover, the 990s did not appear to tie in a
consistent fashion to the IDN’s bond-related filings. Also, the latest available 990s were several years
older than the latest available financial filings. 
Characteristics of Sample IDNs
Collectively, the 15 sample IDNs generated almost $73 billion in total revenues and are in all cases the
market-leading provider of hospital services in their home markets (see Exhibit 1). They range in size
from a little over $2 billion to over $10 billion in annual gross collected revenue. They operate rough-
ly 40,000 acute-care beds. Eight of the 15 operate in metropolitan hospital markets with a Herfindal-
Hirschman Index (HHI) score (a quantitative measure of market concentration) above 2,500, a level
characterized by the U.S. Justice Department as highly concentrated. Four of the IDNs operate the
principal teaching hospitals of major academic health centers. Collectively, they employ almost 17,000
physicians and operate nine of the largest physician groups in the United States. 
Exhibit 1: IDN Resource Description
Exhibit 2, shows that 10 of the 15 IDNs generate net operating income (operating profit) in excess
of $100 million in the sample year. In eight out of the 13 cases that reported community 
benefit in the aggregate, IDN net income exceeded reported community benefit (in a challenging
period for IDN finances). They are wealthy organizations, nine of which have more than $3 billion
in deployable financial assets. The non-operating income generated by these financial assets serve an
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Market FTE Employed
IDN Licensed Beds Conc. (HHI) Physicians Insured Lives
A 1,171 4,499 425 408,000
B 3,047 2,645 335 no health plan
C 2,231 5,669 1,369 81,000
D 1,638 n/a 1,055 429,135
E 1,712 600 1,598 no health plan
F 3,484 3,320 510 452,703
G 3,145 1,718 1,499 no health plan
H 2,784 3,399 1,153 529,000
I 1,897 1,279 n/a 342,264
J 4,831 3,849 794 47,000*
K 3,500 607 986 no health plan
L 2,657 1,209 n/a no health plan
M 5,372 1,994 2,000 no health plan
N 5,397 3,118 1,631 n/a
O 5,086 3,027 3,400 2,223,869
*ACO lives
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important function in insulating the IDN from fluctuations in operating profitability. In seven cases,
the sample IDNs reported non-operating (e.g. investment) earnings exceeding their operating profits. 
Seven of the 15 IDNs operate health plans, and two more either have significant capitated revenue
from delegated-risk contracts with health plans and/or two-sided ACO arrangements (see Exhibit
3). Three of the sample IDNs that do not presently sponsor health plans are actively exploring estab-
lishing a health plan. Through these arrangements, the IDNs are presently at risk for the health costs
of roughly 4.5 million covered lives. The percentage of the total IDN’s revenues at risk range from
zero for those IDNs with no health plans or capitation/ACO contracts, to as much as 62 percent.
Four IDNs have at least one-third of their revenues at risk. 
When one moves beyond the well-documented aggregate financial performance, however, large gaps
in the publicly reported data on the various IDN businesses hamper further analysis. Unlike publicly
traded hospital systems, it is almost impossible to determine from publicly available documents
where in the IDNs’ service portfolio their operating profits come from. 
In particular, it is impossible to determine what profit contribution hospitals make to the IDN. In
only five of the 15 IDNs is it possible to identify what percentage of their total system revenues come
Exhibit 2: IDN Financials (Millions)
Non- Total Long
Net Operating Operating Net Community Financial Term Reporting
IDN Revenue Income Income Income Benefit Assets[1] Debt Year
A $2,051.9 $63.2 $135.7 $198.9 $76.6 $1,721.4 $583.9 2012
B $2,568.4 $184.2 $447.7 $631.8 $243.5 $3,413.1 $778.0 2013
C $3,105.9 $30.8 -$17.3 $13.5 $174.7 $1,254.7 $729.3 2013
D $3,355.1 $163.3 $13.8 $177.2 $215.6[2] $2,576.6 $909.2 2013
E $3,501.0 $185.1 $111.2 $296.3 $119.7[2] $2,928.4 $796.9 2013
F $4,068.2 $263.8 $167.6 $431.4 $282.2 $3,247.8 $960.2 2012
G $4,125.2 $138.0 $60.3 $198.3 $745.6[2] $1,452.1 $1,651.1 2012
H $4,251.6 $364.6 $347.6 $712.2 $188.2 $5,117.8 $1,184.9 2013
I $4,463.5 $47.9 $7.4 $55.3 $403.3 $1,954.5 $815.6 2012
J $4,878.2 $289.5 $311.1 $600.6 $432.9 $4,364.0 $2,359.4 2012
K $4,938.0 $300.2 $465.1 $765.3 $613.7[3] $5,934.0 $1,452.1 2013
L $4,959.8 $175.8 $174.5 $350.3 n/a $3,156.3 $1,488.3 2013
M $6,702.0 $97.9 $164.4 $262.3 $170.0 $3,414.2 $1,470.7 2013
N $9,649.0 -$22.0 $380.0 $358.0 $901.0 $6,005.0 $3,764.0 2013
O $10,188.4 $143.3 $219.1 $362.4 n/a $5,038.8 $3,096.0 2013
[1] Financial Assets comprise total assets less receivables, inventories and similar, and property, buildings, etc.
[2] Includes only charity care and the unpaid cost of Medicare and Medicaid
[3] Total Community Benefit for 2012
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from facilities, let alone from their hospitals. And in all cases, it is impossible to determine the contri-
bution hospital operating profits make to overall IDN profits. In only five of the 15 is it possible to
identify the physician group revenues, let alone their contribution to the IDN’s profit. 
How the IDNs’ health plans compensate the IDNs’ hospitals and physician groups is also impossible
to determine from their filings. Footnotes to IDN financial filings do contain so-called eliminations
that show the overlap between the IDN’s insurance and provider businesses. When one subtracts
documented health plan operating profits from the total IDN’s operating profits, one is left with an
aggregate profit figure for all the other businesses the IDN operates, some of which may, indeed, be
subsidized by the rest. How system overhead is allocated among provider businesses is also impossi-
ble to determine from IDN filings. 
Exhibit 3: IDN Revenues by Line of Business
Beyond system-level financial performance, publicly available quality or efficiency metrics are not
aggregated at the IDN level. Thus, the only way to evaluate an IDN’s performance along these
dimensions is to query performance data on the individual hospitals it operates. We did not have the
resources in this study to aggregate the published performance information across all the hospitals in
the IDN’s portfolio, and thus measure overall IDN performance against industry norms. 
However, we obtained extensive performance information on the flagship hospital in the IDN’s
portfolio (often the original hospital that created the system) from numerous public sources:
Facilities as Insurance[1] Insurance as
Net Facilities % of Total MD Group (Revenue % of Total
IDN Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue At Risk) Revenue
A $2,051.9 n/a n/a n/a $1,268.1 61.8%
B $2,568.4 n/a n/a n/a no health plan n/a
C $3,105.9 n/a n/a n/a $144.3 4.6%
D $3,355.1 n/a n/a $731.6 $1,512.0 45.1%
E $3,501.0 $2,891.1 82.6% $632.3 no health plan n/a
F $4,068.2 $2,724.8 67.0% n/a $1,354.5 33.3%
G $4,125.2 n/a n/a n/a no health plan n/a
H $4,251.6 n/a n/a n/a $1,211.8 28.5%
I $4,463.5 n/a n/a n/a $2,153.7 48.3%
J $4,878.2 n/a n/a n/a $108.0 2.2%
K $4,938.0 n/a n/a n/a no health plan n/a
L $4,959.8 n/a n/a n/a no health plan n/a
M $6,702.0 $6,099.5 91.0% $758.4 no health plan n/a
N $9,649.0 $6,070.0 62.9% $2,497.0 $939.0 9.7%
O $10,188.4 $5,582.4 54.8% $617.8 $4,257.2 41.8%
[1] Insurance revenue includes premiums, capitation paid by other health plans, and double-sided ACO revenues.
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Medicare’s Hospital Compare website, Leapfrog Group’s Safety Reports, Dartmouth Atlas’ extensive
examination of hospital Medicare spending trends at the end of life, and the American Hospital
Directory’s analysis of Medicare cost reports that detail individual hospital’s cost information. 
We then compared performance indicators to those of the flagship hospitals’ most direct local com-
petitor operating in the same geographic market. (See Appendix for listing of the flagship and com-
petitor hospitals for each IDN). In some cases, these competitors were free-standing hospitals of
comparable complexity (operated by a neighboring large integrated group practice or a large acade-
mic health center). In others, these were significant hospitals owned by regional or national multi-
market hospital systems, such as Ascension Health, HCA, or Dignity Health. These comparisons
were a rough attempt to normalize for local wage costs and payor mix, both of which might affect
financial and clinical performance. 
A central concern of this panel is whether market concentration has enabled hospital systems to
extract quasi-monopoly rents from local insurance plans. Because we did not have access to private
insurer claims payments in this analysis, it was impossible for us to answer this question. 
However, we were able to analyze the relationship between market concentration in the IDN’s main
hospital market and the IDN’s profits. As we mentioned earlier, the sample IDNs are dominant
actors in their respective hospital markets. But IDN financial disclosures did not report hospital prof-
its separately, so we were unable to comment upon the role hospital profits play in the overall prof-
itability of the IDN.
However, we found no relationship between HHI and overall IDN prof-
itability, measured either by gross operating profits or operating profits as a
percentage of operating revenues (see Exhibits 4 and 5). It may be that
some IDNs are investing their hospital profits in other businesses that
either lose money (physician groups, e.g.) or that create community bene-
fits (research, education, etc.). But these internal funds flows are impossible
to determine from their public disclosures. Our analysis suggests that what-
ever pricing benefits IDNs might derive from their hospitals’ dominant
market positions do not appear to drop through to the IDN’s bottom line.
There was also no relationship between the size of the IDNs’ bed comple-
ment and profitability, suggesting that merely having a lot of hospital beds
did not automatically confer operating profit advantages (as some advo-
cates of health system mergers have argued).
…we found no relation-
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operating profits or oper-
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Exhibit 4: Operating Income v. HHI ($ in Millions)
Exhibit 5: Operating Income v. Total Beds ($ in Millions)
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
-$100.0
$0.0
$100.0
$200.0
$300.0
$400.0
 
HHI
O
p
er
at
in
g
 In
co
m
e
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
-$100.0
$0.0
$100.0
$200.0
$300.0
$400.0
Total Beds
O
p
er
at
in
g
 In
co
m
e
Issues Related to the IDN Insurance Function
The interaction of the three main IDN businesses is, as Graham Greene would say, the heart of the
matter. Recall the theory of the IDN: In the case of the exemplar, Kaiser, facilities and physicians are
cost inputs whose expenses, along with those of contracted services provided by non-IDN providers,
are subtracted from Kaiser’s pool of premium revenue to determine total system profits. Kaiser thus
has a powerful economic interest in rationalizing the spending on clinical services within a fixed bud-
get. This is the main attraction of this model of integrated care. 
One could reasonably expect that the more revenue an IDN has at risk, the more incentive it has to
manage down its provider spending. In the case of the seven IDNs that operate health plans, clinical
services provided to the captive plans’ patients are an operating cost to the plan. How IDNs price
their services to their own health plan (that is, the transfer price of services to internal subsidiaries) is
a matter of considerable accounting discretion. But there is an upward limit on how generous the
health plan can be to the IDN’s own providers and still be price competitive with the non-integrated
health plans in their regional markets.
The strategic role the health plan plays in the IDN is complex and ambiguous. Does it function as a
feeder to the IDN’s provider system or as a rationer of health services to the IDN’s insured lives, or,
somehow, both? Is the IDN’s insurance risk held in the insurance captive or transmitted to the
IDN’s provider units through population-based provider payment such as capitation? There is a
powerful conflict between maximizing use of fixed provider capacity and being an effective risk-bear-
ing clinical enterprise. How or even whether IDNs manage this conflict is the key to whether they
save their customers, or the society, money. Because only a portion of these IDNs revenues are pre-
mium based, and the remainder of revenues come from open-ended forms of health care payment,
there is no “fixed budget” to compel systemic savings.
Exhibit 6: Operating Margin v. Revenue at Risk
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When we examined performance measures for IDNs, we found that the percentage of “revenue at
risk” neither predicted overall IDN profitability (see Exhibit 6) nor the absolute Medicare Case Mix
Index (CMI) adjusted cost of care at the IDN flagship institution (see Exhibit 7).
Exhibit 7: Case Mix Index Adjusted Average Cost per Case v. Revenue at Risk
We conducted a secondary analysis of the IDN’s “flagship” hospi-
tal Medicare cost per case (CMI adjusted) compared to its main
in-market competitor and whether or not the IDN had any rev-
enue at risk. What we found was that flagship hospitals within
IDNs that have no revenue at risk are on average 6.8 percent less
expensive than their in-market competitors, while flagships within
IDNs that have some revenue at risk are on average 20 percent
more expensive than their competitors. This finding is similar to
one found in the literature review. If there is a cost of care advan-
tage conferred on IDN hospitals by their owner operating a health
plan, it was not apparent from this analysis. 
It is worth noting here that we were unable to determine the role
that a flagship hospital plays in the IDN, clinically or financially. In
some cases, the flagship was the historic source of free cash flow
and also debt used to build the rest of the IDN. In other cases, the
flagship was the asset the system’s strategy and resource allocation
was meant to protect, because it houses the majority of the IDNs research and education activities.
How IDNs allocate system overhead among their hospitals or other IDN components is also not
knowable based on public disclosures. 
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We found no meaningful differences in clinical quality or safety scores (readmissions, infection, or
complication rates) or consumer satisfaction scores between the IDN flagships and their direct in-
market competitors. In the Leapfrog Group’s recent hospital safety ratings, of the 12 pairs where
comparative data were available, seven flagships got the same rating as their competitor, three were
higher and two lower. There were six “A” rated flagships and three with a “C” safety rating.
However, IDN flagships have higher per-case costs and spend more at the end of life than their in-
market competitors. The Dartmouth Atlas has studied extensively how individual hospitals treat
patients in the last two years of life. Resources measured include all health spending for patients
attributed to the hospital, not just the hospital’s own service spending. To us, total spending in the
last two years of life is a measure of the degree of cultural restraint exerted by a medical community
on resource consumption. In the last two years of life, patients often undergo significant health
crises, and family members often exert pressure on the health system to do “whatever it takes” to
help their relative in trouble. 
Thus, variation in spending in the last two years of life provides an excellent
window into the culture of the medical community that uses a hospital and
how effectively the hospital is in coordinating that person’s care. In gener-
al, we believe that controlling the total cost of care, whether per episode or
for specific populations of interest over a time period, is the best aggregate
measure of IDN performance.
As can be seen from Exhibit 8, in 10 of 14 cases where comparative data
were available, the IDN flagship had higher CMI-adjusted Medicare cost
per case than its in-market competitor. This is despite the fact that in four
of those cases, the competitor had a higher Medicare CMI, a rough mea-
sure of service intensity. 
In the Dartmouth analyses of total spending in the last two years of life, in
12 of the 15 comparisons available, the IDN flagship showed higher levels
of health care spending (for services both inside and outside the system)
than its in-market competitor. This was despite the fact that in five of the
12 cases, the competitor hospital had a higher Medicare CMI. In 11 of the
15 paired comparisons, IDN flagships had higher imaging spending, while
12 had higher testing expenditures. These Dartmouth spending figures are
not case-mix adjusted and do not reflect the socio-economic status or pre-
existing health status of the patients cared for. 
The higher flagship care costs were an unexpected finding given that one
major presumed advantage of IDNs is their capability to coordinate care.
Presumably, this would be reflected in lower levels of spending on care at
the end of life. We did not have the time or resources to perform other paired-comparison analyses.
Several readers have suggested that comparing the IDNs’ suburban hospitals with their direct in-
market competitors would have been useful and might have produced more pronounced cost differ-
ences than we found in analyzing their flagships. This analysis would provide valuable additional
evidence on the question of IDN efficiency.
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Exhibit 8: IDN Performance: Flagship Compared to Competitor
Medicare Spending per Decedent in Last Two Years of Life
Case Mix CMI- Adjusted Avg.
Hospital Index (CMI) Cost per Case Total Imaging Tests
A Flagship 1.62 $7,109 $66,009 $1,157 $801
A Competitor 1.94 $6,926 $62,216 $961 $756
B Flagship 1.57 $6,448 $92,733 $1,642 $1,214
B Competitor 2.13 $9,160 $92,208 $1,613 $1,174
C Flagship 1.81 $6,902 $64,618 $743 $1,064
C Competitor 1.76 $6,877 $48,870 $572 $483
D Flagship 1.73 $8,501 $68,185 $748 $511
D Competitor 1.73 $5,713 $62,912 $759 $795
E Flagship 2.32 $11,110 $101,616 $1,636 $1,048
E Competitor 1.80 $10,241 $99,024 $2,095 $980
F Flagship 2.02 $9,069 $69,121 $944 $810
F Competitor 1.67 $5,455 $64,231 $789 $924
G Flagship 1.79 $6,809 $89,378 $1,088 $1,205
G Competitor 2.02 $9,069 $76,146 $780 $760
H Flagship 1.74 $7,267 $64,854 $838 $758
H Competitor 1.83 $5,737 $69,968 $1,027 $734
I Flagship 1.73 $7,236 $93,928 $991 $687
I Competitor 1.63 $6,128 $92,667 $1,242 $1,018
J Flagship 1.97 $7,659 $94,221 $1,708 $1,129
J Competitor 2.25 $8,343 $96,122 $1,705 $1,017
K Flagship 1.63 $8,269 $102,392 $1,652 $1,178
K Competitor 1.58 $7,703 $87,546 $1,216 $1,137
L Flagship 1.88 $12,110 $136,069 $1,416 $810
L Competitor 2.27 $11,309 $120,501 $1,377 $799
M Flagship 1.69 $8,770 $105,042 $2,293 $2,102
M Competitor 1.75 $9,654 $103,254 $2,176 $1,787
N Flagship n/a n/a $83,948 $1,693 $1,169
N Competitor 2.22 $9,041 $80,524 $1,264 $786
O Flagship 2.13 $8,140 $86,281 $1,180 $891
O Competitor 2.21 $6,509 $87,059 $1,134 $630 
Sources: American Hospital Directory, 2012, Dartmouth Atlas, 2010
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Discussion
The 15 IDNs are formidable presences in their markets; frequently, they are the largest employer in
their communities. They are highly complex operationally. Some of the finest medicine in the world
is practiced in these IDN hospitals. They have capable managements, and many have produced
important systemic innovations. Examples include “intelligent” computerized physician order entry
and the clinical quality improvement methods developed at Intermountain Health Care, remote
ICU monitoring systems developed at Johns Hopkins and beta tested at Sentara, and complex care
management protocols developed at Geisinger. 
However, IDNs are also inscrutable institutions. Though they make financial disclosures  to their
bondholders, in only about a third of them is it possible to determine what contribution their vari-
ous provider services make to their operating revenues, let alone to their profitability. It is thus
impossible to answer the question on the minds of this panel: whether these enterprises have used
their market power in hospital or physician services to grow their hospital earnings. As we discussed,
however, overall IDN profits were not higher in highly concentrated hospital markets. However, our
single-year snapshot of performance indicators is no substitute for a multi-year analysis, as 2012 and
2013 were difficult years for many IDNs. 
We were unable, given limited time and resources, to analyze comparative pricing information at any
level (IDN or flagship) to give us a sense of how much these organizations are paid for their services
versus their competitors. That is a task worthy of more detailed analysis. We would include a look at
the IDNs’ smaller hospitals paired against their competitors to make broader generalizations 
possible. 
The interpenetration of IDNs’ provider and insurance businesses add an additional layer of complexi-
ty. What strategic role does insurance play in the IDN portfolio? Is it a risk vehicle that protects con-
sumers and employers from excessive health costs? Or is it a marketing vehicle to bolster the IDN’s
provider market position and help fill its beds and clinic schedules? Or, somehow, both? And how
price competitive are the IDNs health plan premiums compared to health plans that do not own
provider capacity? This question was beyond the scope of our analysis. 
And then there is the added layer of complexity introduced by how the IDN prices its provider ser-
vices to its captive health plan? Does the IDN underprice internal provider services to grow market
share in the insurance market and generate health insurer net income, or does it mark up the prices
for internally provided services (as the insurance market allows) to increase provider incomes? Again,
this is impossible to determine by analyzing IDN public filings. 
There are complex societal efficiency questions. Are IDN-provided hospital, physician, and other ser-
vices less costly or of demonstrably better quality because they come from an integrated entity rather
than from a network of less integrated competitors? We could find no evidence from IDNs’ public
disclosures or publicly available information to support these claims. IDN clinical quality perfor-
mance measures are not aggregated at the enterprise level. What analyses we were able to conduct at
the flagship-competitor level suggested that while there were no measureable qualitative differences,
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IDN flagships were more expensive than their major competitors
both on a Medicare cost-per-case and on a total-cost-of-care basis,
at least for patients at the end of life. 
Are the disclosures we analyzed adequate to understand fully the
risks IDN’s run in operating in multiple markets with conflicting
incentives? We do not believe they are. The disclosures are notably
less illuminating than the reporting required by publicly traded
hospital operators, which contain such useful metrics as salary and
benefits as a percentage of operating expenses, adjusted hospital
admissions and outpatient volumes, and supplies as a percentage of
operating costs, provided on a quarterly basis.
There has been a single, spectacular failure of an IDN in recent
history — the 1998 bankruptcy of the Pennsylvania-based
Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation (AHERF).
Despite ample warning signs of impending difficulty, and a cata-
strophic failure of accountability and oversight over billions of dollars in bonds, AHERF’s collapse
did not lead to meaningful tightening of IDN financial oversight by the investment community
(Burns et al., 2000). The AHERF failure did, however, raise the issue of the quality and effectiveness
of IDN governance to investor attention. 
To reiterate a point made earlier, assumption of premium risk, as well as vertical integration by IDNs
into very large, dispersed physician enterprises, both increase financial risks to IDN bondholders.
Present levels of financial disclosure are, in our opinion, inadequate to fully evaluate these risks. IDN
insurance performance is reported separately to state insurance commissions, but this performance is
not meaningfully relatable to the performance of the IDN’s other businesses. 
Policy Recommendations
We believe far more detailed and uniform voluntary financial and operating disclosures to bond
holders would enable the analysts who follow these securities to understand the contribution to prof-
it (if any) of all the major IDN businesses, as well as the transfer pricing strategies that affect inter-
company sharing of revenues. Providing this more comprehensive information is in the interests of
IDNs as well as financial markets, the health policy community, and society at large. Transparency
and voluntary disclosure by the IDNs themselves is vastly preferable to disclosure required by regula-
tory mandates. 
The two crucial disclosures, in our view, are the sources and amount of hospital operating profit and
the IDN physician compensation policies. How IDNs allocate overhead and ancillary services income
between the three main lines of business should also be disclosed, under standards voluntarily estab-
lished by IDNs themselves. An IDN that generates 95 percent of its profits from its hospitals is
probably not in the population health business. Neither is an organization that pays its physicians on
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patients at the end of life. 
a relative value unit compensation model where they earn more by ordering more tests, or where
they receive a share of the ancillary income they generate. 
It should also be possible to determine from an IDN disclosure if capitated risk is transmitted from
the IDNs health plan or risk-accepting organization to its hospitals, but particularly to its physicians.
If the risk is retained in the health plan, and the hospitals and physicians continue being paid on a
volume-enhancing compensation scheme (per diem, per case, per test, per visit), the IDN is not in
the population health business.
Further, to address directly the issue of the effect of IDN market power on pricing, we believe a
national all-payer claims data base, perhaps building on the work of the Health Care Cost Institute
(HCCI), would be an invaluable resource in evaluating the market effects of IDNs. HCCI’s database
does not presently contain data from the nation’s Blue Cross plans that, in many states, dominate
health insurance markets. Bringing those data together with HCCI’s data would provide far more
illumination of the societal benefits that are created by IDNs and address the question of whether
IDNs are exploiting their market power in hospital or physician markets to charge excessive prices for
key services.
We believe the likelihood that IDNs are producing neither cost nor quality advantages over dispersed
networks of caregivers assembled by health plans raises serious policy questions regarding the reliance
upon ACOs as a contracting model by Medicare or private insurers. The latest growth spurt in IDN
formation has been stimulated in major part by the quasi-risk contracting model embodied in ACOs. 
If the intended end state for regular Medicare payment is full-risk contracting with IDNs, and 
present day IDNs do not display either increased operating efficiency or lower total cost of care 
compared to community-based alternatives, policymakers need to find another payment approach.
What they may be stimulating instead of improved health and cost moderation is the locking down
of hospital and physician markets that led to the creation of the NASI panel in the first place. 
Conclusion 
Integrated delivery networks contain some of the nation’s leading hospitals and medical care profes-
sionals. They have produced systemically important clinical and management innovations and gener-
ate significant community benefits. This report is not intended to denigrate these fine institutions or
their clinicians and managements but rather to raise questions about the mode of health care organi-
zation that they collectively represent. IDNs have also operated under a halo of presumed societal
benefits (quality, efficiency, care integration, etc.) for the better part of four decades with remarkably
little evidence that these benefits in fact exist. 
It is still possible that these societal benefits of IDNs exist. But if they do, given the opacity of pre-
sent IDN disclosure of key operating information, they eluded us in this preliminary investigation. If
public policy is to continue fostering IDN growth and development, a more solid evidentiary foun-
dation for this form of medical care organization seems essential. The mere presumption of societal
benefits of IDN formation or operations is no longer tenable as a policy principle. 
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Appendix: IDN Flagship Hospitals 
and their Competitors
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TARGET INSTITUTIONS
Advocate Health Care
Aurora Health Care
Banner Health Care
BayCare Health System
Geisinger Health System
Henry Ford Health System
Intermountain Healthcare
Johns Hopkins Health System
North Shore–LIJ Health System
Penn Medicine
Presbyterian Healthcare Services
Sanford Health
Sentara Healthcare
Sutter Health
UPMC
FLAGSHIP HOSPITAL
Advocate Lutheran General Hospital
Aurora St. Luke’s Medical Center
Banner Good Samaritan Medical
Center
St. Joseph’s Hospital
Geisinger Medical Center
Henry Ford Hospital – Detroit
LDS Hospital
Johns Hopkins Hospital
North Shore University
Hospital–Manhasset
Hospital of the University of
Pennsylvania
Presbyterian Hospital
Sanford Medical Center Fargo
Sentara Norfolk General Hospital
Sutter Medical Center, Sacramento
UPMC Presbyterian
COMPETITOR INSTITUTION
Northwest Community Hospital
Froedtert Memorial Community
Hospital
St. Joseph’s Hospital and Medical
Center
Tampa General Hospital
Robert Packer Hospital
St. John Hospital and Medical
Center
St. Mark’s Hospital
University of Maryland Medical
Center
Winthrop-University Hospital
Thomas Jefferson University
Hospital
Lovelace Medical Center –
Downtown
Essentia Health
Riverside Regional Medical Center
Mercy General Hospital
Allegheny General Hospital
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